Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications

Law School

1-1-2016

Biometric Identity
Jonathan T. Weinberg
Wayne State University

Recommended Citation
Jonathan T. Weinberg, Biometric Identity, Communications on the ICM, January 2016, Vol. 59 No. 1, Pages 30-32,
https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/1/195732-biometric-identity/fulltext#
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/262

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.

V

viewpoints

DOI:10.1145/2846082

Jonathan T. Weinberg

Law and Technology
Biometric Identity
Assessing the promises and dangers of biometric identity plans.

T

H RE E Y EA RS AGO, the U.S.
Senate passed a comprehensive immigration reform
bill. The drafters of that bill
pushed for a requirement
that every employed person in the
U.S.—whether citizen or noncitizen,
native-born or immigrant—should
have to get a federal government-issued ID card. The holder’s biometric
information, either fingerprints or
a different technology, would be encrypted on the card. Every time a U.S.
worker took a new job, the employer
would take her fingerprints or other
biometric, so as to check her physical
characteristics against the information on the card. If the biometric information matched, it would establish
the job applicant was the card’s rightful bearer. The employer would then
transmit the identity information on
the card to a central database, to verify
she was legally authorized to work. In
the end, though, the drafters dropped
the ID card proposal from the bill.
In India, the government is undertaking to assign to residents 1.2 billion unique “Aadhaar” ID numbers,
linked to each person’s biometrics—
photograph, 10 fingerprints, and two
iris scans. The government aims to
make use and verification of one’s
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Biometric
information helps
connect abstract
legal status to the
physical individual.

Aadhaar number an inseparable part
of daily life. The card is accepted as
identification and proof of address
for banking purposes; authorities
are pushing forward with plans to
use Aadhaar to scrub voting lists;
and a host of government agencies
are making it mandatory under their
programs, all notwithstanding an interim order by India’s Supreme Court
forbidding such requirements.
Both of these stories involve databases with two features. First, they
include entries for all or the vast majority of a country’s residents. Second, there is a mechanism to tie the
data entries to the subjects’ biometric
characteristics, which can be checked
or verified in the field. In that way,
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the physical person—showing up for
work, or presenting herself at an ATM,
or seeking health benefits from a government clinic—can be connected to
her identity and description in the database. The U.S. plan has been the pet
project of a few senators for years, but
has never become law. The government of India, by contrast, has invested 50 billion rupees (US$775,000,000)
in its project and has collected biometric information from 800 million
people so far. That country’s Supreme
Court, though, is currently pondering
the constitutionality of the plan.
Are plans like these desirable?
They present some policy advantages;
biometric identification techniques
enable governments to achieve certain popularly supported goals more
successfully. In the U.S., the law forbids employers to hire people who
are in the country illegally or on temporary visas, unless the Department
of Homeland Security has granted
them work authorization. But whether a person at a particular moment
has legal work authorization (or legal
immigration status) is not apparent
when looking at her; the information
resides in a database in Washington,
D.C. She may present governmentissued documents, but those docu-
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An employee uses an Aadhaar-based entry system to verify identity at a building in New Delhi, India.

ments may be somebody else’s; taking her biometric information helps
connect abstract legal status to the
physical individual.
Pakistan was able to rely on biometric (fingerprint-based) ID cards to provide reconstruction grants to families
affected by severe flooding, without
too much money going astray. Some
countries take voters’ biometric data in
order to de-duplicate voting lists (that
is, to ensure single individuals do not
appear on voter registration lists multiple times). Integration of biometric
identification into the system for paying government employees in Nigeria
is said to have helped uncover more
than 60,000 “ghost workers.”
More generally, people need some
way of verifying their identity so governments will provide them with
services and businesses will enter
into relationships with them. Governments want satisfactory proof of
identity, and often proof of residency
or citizenship (which in turn is predicated on proof of identity) before they
provide payments such as pension or

welfare benefits, or allow individuals
to vote, or grant passports or register property transfers. Private actors
require people to verify their identity
before they can take such steps as
opening a bank account, renting an
apartment, or cashing a check.
In the industrialized West, these
concerns have been addressed primarily through birth registration:
Children are registered with the state
at birth, and are entitled to documents as proof. They can use those
documents to get others such as
driver’s licenses and passports. All of
those documents, tied to an entry in
some official database, can be used
to verify the holder’s identity. But in
some poorer countries that does not
work, because as many as 70% of all
births go unregistered. That is why
projects like Aadhaar, in a variety of
less-industrialized countries, are exploring the use of biometrics as a way
of tying individuals directly into identity-verifying databases.
The connection of our physical
bodies to entries in government da-

tabases, though, is also problematic.
Consider the main episodes in U.S.
history where government not only
issued biometric ID, but required
persons to carry that ID. Before the
Civil War, free blacks were sometimes required to carry certificates
that recited their names and employers and included the mid-19th-century
version of biometrics: they described
the worker’s physical characteristics,
including such matters as age, complexion, build, height, and scars. A
free black without adequate identification risked being arrested or enslaved. After 1892, U.S. law required
all Chinese persons in the U.S. to carry
“certificates of residence” validating
their immigration status, on penalty
of deportation. Congress mandated
that each card contained the holder’s
photograph; that biometric, said a
senator, was “the only effective method” for identifying Chinese migrants.
When the U.S. government next
told a group of people they had to carry
cards with biometric identifiers at all
times, it was 1952. The card in ques-
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tion was the “green card” issued to
noncitizen residents in the U.S.; the
motivation was fear of the Communist
threat. Congress members, worrying
that outsiders sympathetic to enemy
countries would act as a fifth column,
mandated that all noncitizens carry
their immigration documentation
wherever they went. That law is still on
the books today.
That is not a confidence-inspiring
record. When U.S. law has imposed
requirements that certain people
carry biometric ID at all times, it has
been so a target could be required to
show a document linking him to a dataset telling law enforcement officers
whether to enslave, detain, or deport
him. That is the promise and the danger of biometric ID systems. ID systems without a biometric component
have limited law-enforcement value,
because they lack good mechanisms
by means of which police can connect
the persons standing in front of them
to the documents they produce. Biometric ID systems enable better identification, but more effective policing
carries risks of its own.
It is perhaps not coincidental,
then, that modern U.S. thinking incorporates a severe allergy to anything
that looks like a biometric national
ID card. Americans have accepted the
Social Security number, which in practice serves as a unique common identifier linking them to entries in a variety
of federal and private databases. They
have accepted a requirement that they
carry—and often produce—driver’s
licenses while driving. But they need
not carry or display driver’s licenses at
other times, and driver’s licenses do
not display a unique common identifier that could reliably identify the
holder across federal databases. In
particular, it is illegal for a driver’s license or any other state-issued identification document to display the holder’s Social Security number.
Besides the baseline concerns associated with police being able to easily and effectively identify citizens,
one can identify a wide range of more
nuanced risks flowing from government identity systems’ coming to rely
on biometric identifiers and a central
database in some manner associated
with them. One risk relates to data security: Can the government keep this
32

COMMUNICATIO NS O F TH E AC M

It is important to be
mindful of
the substantial
privacy risks
associated
with biometric
identity plans.

information safe, avoiding either privacy breaches or identity theft? One
of the claims made by plaintiffs in
the Aadhaar litigation is that data security for the submitted information
is unacceptably weak. A second risk
relates to the damage done by (the
inevitable) bad information in the
database, especially if use of the card
or biometrics becomes ubiquitous.
Will the database become so useful
it is treated as presumptively correct,
with bad information difficult or impossible to change? Intentionally
planting bad information would then
be an excellent route to identity theft
or worse.
Another concern: To the extent the
use of a biometric or card to verify identity becomes routine in everyday transactions, it would be easy to structure
the system so each use of the card adds
information to the relevant databases.
That would fatten the data portfolios
maintained on each citizen and would
limit individuals’ ability to undertake
everyday activities free of surveillance.
Finally, the government might gain
leverage over the citizenry through
its power to revoke or limit the use of
card or biometric data to verify identity—what happens when government
decides to flag the database entries of
undesirable citizens so their biometrics or cards can no longer be used to
obtain services?
The implementation details of any
biometric identity plan are key. The
designers of the proposed U.S. worker
ID plan, thus, sought to forestall objections by ensuring no biometrics
would be stored in the central data-
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base; rather, their plan was that biometrics would be stored only on individuals’ cards, to be checked against
their physical characteristics using
card readers in the field. That way,
central government authorities would
not have access to the biometrics at
all. The Aadhaar plan, by contrast,
does not rely on cards: biometrics are
stored centrally so a person’s merely
presenting his fingerprints identifies
him to the system.
Another approach avoiding some
risks would tie citizens’ biometrics
only to limited-purpose databases—
designed for particular functions and
not calling up other information in
the government’s possession—rather than to an all-encompassing database (or a linked set of databases)
containing multiple classes of information. Such functional structures
can be less expensive than multipurpose identity platforms (although
not if a country ends up establishing
multiple, separate biometric systems
serving separate goals). Some countries, for example, have done biometric registration for the limited purpose of enabling voting in national
elections. But limited-purpose biometric identity plans can find their
focus shifting; in several countries
that have set up single-purpose voter
registration systems, the voter registration card has become a de facto
national ID card. In the U.S., the Social Security number, created for a
limited purpose, rapidly became a
unique common identifier.
It is important to be mindful of the
substantial privacy risks associated
with biometric identity plans. This
does not mean they are always a bad
idea; in a country where many individuals have no means of identity verification at all, some form of appropriately
structured biometric identification
system can make people better off. But
we have not done well in the past in the
U.S. imposing biometric ID requirements, and—given the strength of our
existing systems for identity verification—the risks (and costs) of any such
plan in the U.S. would likely far outweigh the benefits.
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